Moral debate per Alasdair MacIntyre

In After Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre asks, What salient characteristics do debates and disagreements about morality share? He says there are three kinds.

"The first is what I shall call, adapting an expression from the philosophy of science, the conceptual incommensurability of the rival arguments in each of the three debates. Every one of the arguments is logically valid or can be easily expanded so as to be made so; the conclusions do follow from the premises. But the rival premises are such that we possess no rational weighing the claims of one as against another. For each premise employs some quite different normative or evaluative concept from the others, so that the claims made upon us are of quite different kinds. In the first argument, for example, premises which invoke justice and innocence are at odds with premises that invoke success and survival; in the second,  premises which invoke rights are at odds with those that invoke universalizability; in the third it is the claim of equality that is matched against liberty. It is precisely because there is in society no established way of deciding between these claims that moral argument appears to be necessarily interminable. From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion. Hence perhaps the slightly shrill tone of so much moral debate" (p. 8, pb). 

"A second, equally important, but contrasting, characteristic of these arguments is that they do none the less purport to be impersonal rational arguments" (p.8).

"A third salient characteristic of contemporary moral debate is intimately related to the first two. It is easy to see that the different conceptually incommensurable premises of the rival arguments deployed in these debates have a wide variety of historical origins. The concept of justice in the first argument has its roots in Aristotle's account of the virtues; the second argument's genealogy runs through Bismarck and Clausewitz to Machiavelli; the concept of liberation in the the third argument has shallow roots in Marx, deeper roots in Fichte. In the second debate a concept of rights which has Lockean antecedents is matched against a view of universality which is recognizably Kantian and an appeal to the moral law, which is Thomist. In the third debate an argument which owes debts to T.H. Green and to Rousseau and competes with one which has Adam Smith as a grandfather" (p. 10).  

Dependent Rational Animals #3

In my final post about Dependent Rational Animals I will not give summaries for the remaining chapters and only list their titles.

Chapter 5. How impoverished is the world of the nonhuman animal?

Chapter 6. Reasons for action

Chapter 7. Vulnerability, flourishing, goods, and ‘good’

Chapter 8, How do we become independent practical reasoners?

Chapter 9. Social relationships, practical reasoning, common goods, and individual goods

Chapter 10. The virtues of acknowledged dependence

Chapter 11. The political and social structures of the common good

Chapter 12. Proxies, friends, truthfulness

Chapter 13. Moral commitment and rational enquiry


Lest anyone conclude that MacIntyre’s saying a lot about dependency implies or even suggests he uses it as a bridge to altruism as conceived by Auguste Comte or Ayn Rand, a deontological ethics, or utilitarianism, that is not the case. He is a virtue ethicist in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. Virtue ethics identifies the central question of morality as having to do with the habits and knowledge concerning how to live a good life. His approach seeks to demonstrate that good judgment emanates from good character.  

Dependent Rational Animals #2

Some key points from Chapter 2 of Dependent Rational Animals follow.

Aristotle made the distinction between the living and the inanimate, putting humans with other animals except for humans being the only rational ones. Both perceive. Later philosophers tied language use with rationality. It has been commonly argued that nonhuman animals do not possess the requisite kind of language for other capacities. That is, nonhuman animals cannot have thoughts, must lack beliefs, cannot act for reasons and in their encounters with the objects of their experience must be innocent of concepts.

The title of Chapter 3 is The intelligence of dolphins.

The title of  Chapter 4 is Can animals without language have beliefs?

Dependent Rational Animals #1

Dependent Rational Animals is the title of a book by Alasdair MacIntyre. I had heard of him several times and knew he was a virtue ethicist, but had not read any of his books. I enjoyed reading this one. I may try others.

This post will present some key parts of the first chapter.

Two sets of facts – about our vulnerabilities and afflictions and our dependence on others – are so evident that no credible account of the human condition should avoid their importance. Yet the history of Western philosophy suggests otherwise with rare exceptions. When the ill, the injured and the otherwise disabled are presented, it is near always about the benevolence of those who are continuously rational, healthy, and untroubled. Even someone as perceptive as Adam Smith, when recognizing ill health and old age, finds reason to put them on one side. This is true of philosophy in general.

It is similar with dependence. Dependence on others is most obvious in childhood and old age. Philosophers have recognized it in a general way, but the full extent of it is generally absent. When Aristotle discusses the need for friends in times of adversity and loss, he insists that manly men differ from women in being unwilling to have others saddened by their grief. They do not want to share it or let it affect others. Aristotle says the magnanimous man is forgetful of what he has received, but remembers what he has given.

Thus Aristotle anticipated Adam Smith and others the standpoint of those who feel self-sufficiently superior. Modern moral philosophy has understandably and rightly placed great emphasis on individual autonomy and making independent choices. MacIntyre will argue that the virtues of independent rational agency need accompanied by the virtues of acknowledged dependence and a failure to understand this is apt to obscure some features of rational agency.

MacIntyre only mentions the dependence of children in Chapter 1, but does cover that in later chapters. He says little about dependency in the workplace – which one might prefer to call interdependence – anywhere. 

Dirty secrets of capitalism??

The speaker in this video of a TED talk, Nick Hanauer, claims the “dirty little secret” of capitalism is neoliberal economic theory. He claims the assumptions of neoliberalism are wrong, especially “selfishness.” The “new” economics he supports holds cooperation and reciprocity as central. He doesn’t explain what “reciprocity” means. Is it trade, in which customers pay for products or services? Does it include employers paying its own employees?

The Mises Institute responds to that part of the TED talk here. Excerpts:

- “But Hanauer can’t bring himself to praise that kind of cooperation and reciprocity because market exchange also involves self-interest and competition.”

- “Reciprocity and cooperation are indeed good things. But contrary to what Hanauer thinks, they are, in fact, the very basis of capitalism, a system of voluntary exchanges.”

Like many people do, Hanauer seems to regard selfishness and altruism as wholly mutually exclusive. Some actions are entirely one or the other, but not all are. Suppose a wife buys groceries for herself, her husband, and their children. Suppose one partner of a business acts for the benefit of the partnership that benefits the other partner(s) as well. Are such actions selfish or altruistic? Or both?

Hanauer claims that neoliberalism holds that the purpose of a corporation is only to enrich the shareholders. Not exactly, at least per the main advocate of a similar idea. Milton Friedman said it was the main purpose (link); “main” and “only” aren’t identical.

More than three years before this TED talk, Richard Epstein debated Hanauer about Hanauer’s idea of “middle out” economics (contra “top-down” or “trickle down”) and a minimum wage (link). 

JARS 18.1

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Volume 18, Number 1, July 2018 has been published. The Table of Contents is here. The article Egoism and Others is by yours truly.

Also of note is Robert Campbell's review of Harry Binswanger's book How We Know. I made several posts about How We Know on this blog during June-August, 2017. Campbell's review is more critical than mine, and our criticisms are about very different things.

The Is-Ought Problem #2

I wrote about the is/ought problem almost two years ago here. Therein I said I had decided that an "ought" statement cannot be deduced from an "is" statement – which agrees with David Hume -- but an "ought" statement can be based on an "is" statement.

Hume’s famous statement of it is included here. He denied deducing an “ought” from an “is.” On the other hand, he indirectly denied any connection between the two using reason. This is likely why some call it Hume's guillotine.

I recently saw a video by Yaron Brook of the Ayn Rand Institute in which he talks about the is-ought problem. Around 2:00 he talks about generating an “ought” from an “is” and bridging the is-ought gap. I believe these are other ways of saying an "ought" statement can be based on an "is" statement, but they are not by deduction. 

I also saw this article about Ayn Rand and the is-ought problem. I liked his following syllogisms about is/ought:

“The sole difficulty arises over the derivability of values from facts. 

The following syllogism does not violate Hume's Law:

     One ought not to murder human beings.
     Socrates is a human being.
     Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates.

On the other hand, the syllogism below does violate Hume's Law:

     Human beings have a right to life.
     Socrates is a human being.
     Therefore, one ought not to murder Socrates.

The second syllogism is defective, for it requires for its conclusion the premise that one ought to respect the rights of others. Add that assumption, and one has a valid syllogism which integrates facts and values” (84-5).

My book review: Patterns of Moral Complexity

I wrote an Amazon book review of Patterns of Moral Complexity by Charles Larmore.

If you find the review helpful, please check the Yes button at the end.