Scientific Revolutions #7

In The Rationality of Science W. H. Newton-Smith calls Thomas Kuhn a non-realist (ref. #6) because Kuhn's model of science makes problem solving the goal rather than the pursuit of truth. He says Kuhn doesn't make truthfulness the main goal of science because it cannot be given a rational justification. In other words, there is no algorithm for choosing which of two competing theories is better in all such comparisons. His exact words follow.

"Thus the use of models for the explanation of change is not the exclusive prerogative of the rationalist. Kuhn, for example, has a model of science which makes the goal problem solving and in which the principles of comparison are the five ways [ref. #5]. What makes Kuhn a non-rationalist is his thesis that these cannot be given an objective justification. This in no way precludes his using his model in generating minirat [*] accounts, a good example of which is found in his recent study of Planck. In this work, in which, interestingly, Kuhn does not make any use of his own theoretical framework of gestalt shifts between incommensurable paradigms, he explains why Planck opted for his distribution law for the radiation given off by a black body through a reconstruction of Plank's beliefs and reasoning processes. One example of a general methodological belief would cite as explaining the scientific community's acceptance of Planck's theory is the belief in the importance of theoretical unification. This, in part, motivated the community to prefer to use Planck's single formula which covers all temperatures instead of Wien's formula for low temperatures and the Rawleigh-Jeans law for high temperatures. ... This means that a rational representation of science should consist not of a single model but an evolving series of models " (p. 224-5). 

* minimal rational account -- an explanation of theory choice which does not include a normative assessment of the goal, or an evaluation of the truth or falsity, or the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the beliefs. 

I see no sharp difference between Newton-Smith's use of real and rational (and their conjugates).

Scientific Revolutions #6

Regardless of how one evaluates Thomas Kuhn's ideas about scientific revolutions, his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was a huge impetus in discussions of their nature. Commentary on the nature of science and scientific entities and methods preceded Kuhn's book, but the book spurred revisiting said nature, entities, methods, and scientific instruments.

Broadly speaking, scientific realism is the view that science is about reality. But there are significant nuances pertaining to truthfulness, aims versus achievements, mind-independence, what is or isn't knowledge, and more, including claims about unobservables (atoms, radio waves, etc.). This article Scientific Realism sketches the major nuances.

Antirealism is the term used for various arguments against, or foils for, scientific realism. One of these is instrumentalism, which holds that claims about unobservable things have no literal meaning. While the linked article doesn't mention Galileo and his religious detractors, it reminded me of them. Said detractors didn't object to some of Galileo's claims when viewed as instrumental, as mathematically useful. However, they did object to saying said claims were true when they conflicted with Biblical text.

Personal Knowledge #3

Two conflicting systems of thought are separated by a logical gap. "Formal operations relying on one framework of interpretation cannot demonstrate a proposition to persons who rely on another framework.  Its advocates may not succeed in getting a hearing from them, since they must first teach them a new language, and no one can learn a new language unless he first trusts that it means something. A hostile audience in fact may in fact deliberately refuse to entertain novel conceptions ... because its members fear that once they have accepted this new framework they will be lead to conclusions which they -- rightly or wrongly -- abhor. Proponents of a new system can convince their audience only by first winning their intellectual sympathy for a doctrine they have not yet grasped. Those who listen sympathetically will discover for themselves what they would otherwise have never understood. Such an acceptance is a heuristic process, a self-modifying act, and to this extent a conversion. It produces disciples forming a school, the members of which are separated for the time being a logical gap from those outside it. They think differently, speak a different language, live in a different world, and at least one of the two schools is excluded to this extent for the time being (whether rightly or wrongly) from the community of science" (Personal Knowledge 151).

The above has some resemblance to the idea of different paradigms posited by Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (link). Polanyi's book was published three years before Kuhn's. Kuhn's book refers to Polanyi or Personal Knowledge only about tacit knowledge, which is acquired through practice but not explicitly articulated. However, it seems Kuhn made the gap between the adherents of different schools of thought wider.

Polanyi titled his book Personal Knowledge in contrast to the widely held idea that true knowledge is deemed impersonal and objective. Polanyi holds that tacit knowledge is a significant part of personal knowledge, yet not subjective.