On Peikoff's ‘Fact and Value’

I wrote the following 28 years ago. At that time I gave copies to a few people, but did not publish it. The forthcoming book referred to in the last paragraph is Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. 'Fact and Value' had the lead role in the Objectivist schism of 1989. Most other comments about the schism have been about whether Objectivism is closed or open, or about sanctioning. I considered that a mere "turf war" then, and still do.

ON PEIKOFF’S ‘FACT AND VALUE’

by Merlin Jetton        July 27, 1989

The series of articles by Peter Schwartz, David Kelley, and Leonard Peikoff was both interesting and disappointing to read. It amazes me that such a heated exchange could arise from the mere event of David Kelley making a speech.

I have come to expect such behavior from Schwartz. He has a history of making straw men and burning them. He sometimes makes bizarre judgments. He did that in this instance, operating under the principle that one should judge a speech by its audience and its content is irrelevant. But to me Peikoff’s article ‘Fact and Value’ was the most disturbing part of the exchange. It was not just that he put words in Kelley’s mouth and was unfair in judging him. There are probably many people who would agree with that. There will probably be much said and written about it, so I shall, for the most part, leave that subject for others. The most disturbing part of Mr. Peikoff’s article was the illogical statements. He is the most prominent living spokesman for Objectivism, a philosophy which is committed to reason and logic. As such, I would expect from him a more acute attention to logic.

I considered calling this article “The All or Nothing Syndrome”, which is an affliction of Mr. Peikoff’s. It refers to the tendency to obliterate the distinction between “some” and “all” (or between “none” and “some”), which is an extremely important one in logic. There are several instances of it in Peikoff’s article.

He says, “In my judgment, Kelley’s paper is a repudiation of the fundamental principles of Objectivism.” Kelley and Peikoff clearly have different views about the relationship between fact and value. But did Kelley repudiate “A is A”? Does disagreement on just one principle imply disagreement on all of them?

He argues for the principle: Every “is” implies an “ought”. Note that the first word is “every”, not “some”. The word “every” makes it an overstatement. It baffles me to hear that any trivial, irrelevant fact implies an “ought.” There is the always applicable one that I ought to regard it as a fact, but that is far from the principle’s intended meaning.

He claims that the good is a species of the true and that evil is a species of the false. This is an apparently profound idea, so I did not take it lightly. Consider the logic of this statement. It says if X has the attribute “good”, then X necessarily also has the attribute “true”, and that if X has the attribute “evil”, then X necessarily also has the attribute “false”. I have a few comments:

Some X being both good and true does not imply that any X which is good is also true; similarly for both evil and false.

Hitler was evil. Would Peikoff also say he was “false”? If so, that is bizarre.

It implies there is no such thing as an evil truth. Is the fact that Hitler and the Nazis murdered millions of people not an evil truth? And Peikoff later gives examples of bad truths, such as too much exposure to the sun is bad and getting caught in a tidal wave is bad, which are inconsistent with the claim.

Similarly, it implies there is no such thing as a good falsehood, for which a counterexample easily comes to mind. Suppose A tells a lie to B to protect C, where B has malicious intent and C is innocent of wrongdoing.

It is muddled. There are truths about what is good for us and about what is bad for us. It is good for us to know these truths. There are falsehoods about what is good for us and what is bad for us. It may be or is (the right verb depends on the case) bad for us if we believe these falsehoods. This makes sense, but it is far from what he wrote.

I checked Ayn Rand’s writing for an idea having any resemblance to it and found nothing. And Peikoff exhorts the reader to not rewrite Objectivism!

He correctly paraphrases Kelley as saying: Truth and falsity apply primarily to ideas, and good and evil primarily to actions. Note that Kelley uses the word “primarily”, not “exclusively” or “only”. Yet Peikoff launches an extended polemic as if Kelley had said one of the latter. Admittedly Kelley gave a couple of poor examples in discussing the subject. Kelley also failed to make it clear that no dichotomy can be drawn between a man’s ideas and his actions. But did Peikoff deliberately misrepresent Kelley to set up his polemic? Or did he fail to note the logical import of the word “primarily” means there are exceptions? Either way, it does not speak well for Mr. Peikoff.

He devotes a substantial part of his article to his ideas about the connection between fact and value, between cognition and evaluation. He summarizes his view in a single principle -- cognition implies evaluation -- which he says is the main point of his article. In my opinion, when he was writing this, he was so eager to railroad Kelley that he let his emotions interfere with his reasoning and clear communication. (Does this mean that his evaluation implied his cognition?) This is a topic on which I have not spent sufficient time to articulate well my own ideas, but I shall not let that stop me from making a few comments:

I found it difficult understanding clearly what he said and I attribute it to his lack of clarification of key concepts. For example, “evaluation” may mean a judgment about true/false or about good/bad. Ayn Rand more than once said that to properly evaluate what someone says or writes, look for the definitions. Well, I found none in Peikoff’s exposition.

I will presume that he meant by his principle something like this: one should properly understand the phenomena or idea (Objectivist epistemology), then decide whether it is good or bad based on one’s understanding (and act accordingly). If this is even close, then I believe he made a poor choice of words by using “imply”. This is a term of logic and generally means the consequence follows necessarily from the premise(s). But cognition and evaluation are volitional, so evaluation is not a necessary, automatic consequence of cognition. Cognition and evaluation can only be connected logically by thinking, which is volitional.

Mr. Peikoff said “every cognition implies an evaluation”, using “evaluation” in the sense of good/bad. If he really believes that, then I say his belief is seriously flawed. It would be a gross overstatement. If the instance of cognition were one of learning a new subject or idea and the knowledge gained were not instantaneously integrated, it would be a gross mistake to make such an evaluation. Facing reality and making good judgments also requires proper recognition of one’s state of knowledge.

Now imagine a person who believes that every cognition demands moral evaluation and who is afflicted with the all-or-nothing syndrome. That person would be overzealous to pass moral judgment and would do so on a fragment of evidence, evading any evidence which would indicate a different judgment.

Mr. Peikoff may have impressed a few readers by pointing out the contrapositive of his principle, i.e. that non-evaluation implies non-cognition, but I saw it as a misuse of logic. One of my previous comments was about the use of “imply” in this context. Another pointed out an obvious counterexample to ‘all cognition implies evaluation’. His contrapositive applied to that counterexample is: If the person did not pass moral judgment, then the person learned nothing!

Mr. Peikoff tries to posit a much more extensive connection between true/false and good/evil, between “is” and “ought”, and between fact and value than can be reasonably substantiated. It was both innovative and revolutionary for Ayn Rand to hold that there was such a connection, considering that Hume and many later philosophers held that there was absolutely no connection. However, the negation of “none” is “some”, not “all”.

Peikoff says “Kelley’s viewpoint is an explicit defense of a dichotomy between fact and value, or between cognition and evaluation, and thus between mind and body.” Here is misrepresentation and a non sequitor in the same sentence! Kelley defended a difference or distinction between fact and value, but hardly a dichotomy. Even if Kelley had defended a dichotomy between cognition and evaluation, it would be a dichotomy between two functions of mind, which clearly would not imply a dichotomy between mind and body.

Mr. Peikoff says, “a proper philosophy is an integrated whole, any change in any element of which would destroy the entire system.” I have two comments:

It implies no one philosophical principle is stronger than any other. In other words, every philosophical principle is equally important. I find this notion totally contrary to Peikoff’s often repeated claim that knowledge is hierarchical.

It seems to say you either have it all right or none of it right. It is another instance of the all-or-nothing syndrome.

He did not discuss the Libertarians like Schwartz did, but he did say he completely agreed with Schwartz, who is also much afflicted with the all-or-nothing syndrome. An example is: Some Libertarians are anarchist-subjectivists. They are morally reprehensible. Therefore, any Libertarian is morally reprehensible.

Mr. Peikoff’s all-or-nothing syndrome appears again in his closing paragraphs. He tells readers, in effect, to agree with him totally or disassociate themselves with Objectivism. This article makes me wonder how Objectivism will flourish with him carrying the torch. Logical flaws and the all-or-nothing syndrome make poor impressions. The all-or-nothing syndrome may come in handy in polemics and politics, but it is anti-logic and anti-reason. I believe it is inappropriate for anyone who considers himself/herself to be objective.

I have made some strong criticisms of Mr. Peikoff here, so it seems appropriate that my closing be tolerant, and I shall not pass judgment on him solely on the basis of ‘Fact and Value’ and be guilty of the all-or-nothing syndrome. I did agree with parts of his description of Objectivism. I have appreciated his past lectures. I shall probably be tolerant enough to buy his forthcoming book.