How We Know #8: Higher Level Concepts

“The intensity of seeing varies in regard to: clarity, acuity, time, attention, and purpose” (HWK, 164).

"Considering the wealth of conceptual subdivisions of "seeing" that have been formed to capture sub-ranges within the above axes of measurement. Here are some, listed in alphabetical order: descry, espy, gawk, glance, glimpse, look, ogle, peak, scan, stare, watch" (165).

Huh? What axes of measurements? There are some measurable differences, e.g. time, between these subdivisions. On the other hand, they are not fully sorted by time. Moreover, there are qualitative differences as well that Binswanger does not acknowledge as qualitative, for example, different purposes. Also, regarding these alleged measurements, what standard unit analogous to an inch and what measurement instrument analogous to a ruler or tape measure apply? For the sake of argument hypothesize such a standard unit. How is it that gawk is N₁ of said units, glance is N₂ of said units, scan is N₃ of said units, and so forth, where the N's are non-ordinal numbers? To echo a frequent comment Ayn Rand made: Blank out. Am I using a different meaning of "measurement" than Binswanger? Yes, one that is more rigorous, objective, and based in perception, which is the ultimate base of all knowledge. It is not some fuzzy or corrupted meaning.

Binswanger does not say what measurements are "omitted” for the concept motion. He only mentions "measurement ranges that were left open in forming" the concept (154). Regardless, the concept motion highlights qualitative differences even more. Varieties of motion include walking, running, crawling, flying, riding, swimming, jumping, rolling, swinging, and dancing. Non-human motions would add many more varieties. Are the differences between all these subdivisions of motion solely a matter of measurements? Clearly not; they differ qualitatively. For example, swimming is in water and the others are not. Riding in a car is different in multiple ways from the others. Running, walking, crawling, jumping and dancing use the legs in qualitatively different ways.

It also follows that, contra Binswanger (p. 166-7) and Rand, teleological measurement is a flimsy metaphor. It is teleological ranking. The differences between authentic measurement as I described above and ranking overwhelm their similarity.