This is the title of a book by Michael Tomasello. The author tries to
explain the uniqueness of human thought and behavior by comparing
them to great apes. The overarching hypothesis is shared
intentionality. It comprises a two-step evolutionary process:
joint intentionality (mainly two actors) followed by
collective intentionality (more than two actors). (p. 31). The
latter evolved into cultural or institutional practices and norms.
He writes: “In joint collaborative activities in which the partners
are independent, it is in the interest of each partner to help the
other play her role. This is the basis for a new motive in human
communication, not available to other apes [ ], namely the motive to
help the other by informing her of situations relevant to her.” (p.
50)
“When great apes work together in experiments, there is an almost
total absence of intentional communication of any kind [ ]. When
apes communicate with one another in other contexts, it is always
directive [ ].”
“The emergence of the informative communicative motive, alongside
the general great ape directive motive, had three important
consequences for the evolution of uniquely human thinking.”
“First, the informative motive led communicators to make a
commitment to informing others of things honestly and accurately,
that is, truthfully.” (p. 51)
“The second important consequence of this new cooperative way of
communicating was that it created a new kind of inference, namely, a
relevance inference.” (p. 52)
“The third and final consequence of this newly cooperative way of
communicating was that there now emerged, at least in nascent form, a
distinction between communicative force – as overtly expressed in
requestive and informative intonations – and situational or
propositional content as indicated by the pointing gesture.” (p.
54).
Sounds like an interesting book. I wonder how much he has picked up from John Searle. Searle makes a distinction between propositional content and what he calls illocutionary force. It is hard to see in a pre-linguistic world, how propositional content could exist at all without more than one language speaker evolving at exactly the same time. It seems communicative force must come first, i.e. commands, warnings, etc...
ReplyDeleteThe book mentions Searle a few times, but there is not much about his ideas.
ReplyDeleteAs my quotes indicate, Tomasello says that all communication between apes is directive with "an almost total absence of intentional communication." It seems he used "intentional" more narrowly, meaning intending to "help the other by informing her of situations relevant to her."
I find the distinction interesting but not fully convincing. For example, monkeys make “alarming” noises when a predator such as an eagle comes near. That seems more informative than directive to me. Anyway, claims about the intentions of non-humans seem very speculative to me, since they can’t verbalize their intentions like most humans can.