The
productivity theory of interest is analogous to wages and labor.
Employers pay workers for the output their labor makes possible.
Similarly, if capitalists provide a capital good, the capitalist must
be paid interest commensurate with the increase in output that the
capital good makes possible. Murphy holds that Böhm-Bawerk
brilliantly refuted this line of reasoning. He quotes Böhm-Bawerk:
"I
grant without ado that capital actually possesses the physical
productivity ascribed to it, that is to say, that more goods can
actually be produced with its help than without. I will also grant
... that the greater amount of goods produced with the help of
capital has higher value than the smaller amount of goods produced
without it. But there is not one single feature in the whole set of
circumstances to indicate that this greater amount of goods must be
worth more
than the capital consumed in its production.
And that is the feature of the phenomenon of excess value that must
be explained" (Choice
227-8)
It
seems to me that Böhm-Bawerk attacked a straw man of the
productivity theory.
"Literally
to ascribe to capital a power of producing value is to misunderstand
the essential nature of value, and to misunderstand the essential
nature of production completely. Value is not produced at all, and
cannot be produced. We never produce anything but forms, shapes of
materials, combinations of material, that is to say, things, goods"
(Capital
and Interest
90).
Probably
critics of the Marxist notion of "surplus value" contended
that "capital produces value." That can be regarded as a
shorter way of saying "capital produces things that have value."
Böhm-Bawerk's interpretation makes it a straw man.
After
great praise for John Rae (Capital
and Interest
208), Böhm-Bawerk even chides Rae for conflating physical returns
with value returns, protesting that prices would adjust to normalize
the exchange value surplus or rate of return, in the technically more
productive processes. Rae could hardly have arrived at this correct
result since he lacked “the modern theory of marginal utility.”
(Herbener, The
Pure Time-Preference Theory of Interest 31).
While
Murphy defends the time-preference theory in Choice,
he apparently had a little different view not much earlier. "Second,
Murphy argues that if pure time preference theorists define time
preference in terms of satisfactions and not goods, then time
preference is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the rate of
interest as defined as the intertemporal exchange rate of goods.
This criticism also misses the mark since in the PTPT the rate of
interest is not the intertemporal exchange rate of goods. With the
intertemporal exchange of money, pure time preference is both
necessary and sufficient to explain the pure rate of interest"
(Herbener 55-6).
To
be continued.
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