More from Peter Coffey's Epistemology; Or the Theory of Knowledge follows.
After routing Kant's ideas about space, he does the same with Kant's notion of time. Kant didn't have near as much to say about time as he did space, but he considered time to be no more a characteristic of things than space. Like space it is a priori form of perception, but he regarded space as an external form and time as an internal form (Vol. 2, p. 202).
"One final and fatal flaw in Kant's thesis that time is a form of our perception of events is this. He himself is forced to recognize that some temporal relations belong to the physical events which we perceive: that there are, in these, temporal successions, which by virtue of their irreversibility, differ from mere successions (e.g. that of the moon moving around the earth), as objective, from other successions (e.g. of our impressions as we survey the parts of a house) as subjective. Hence time would not be a form or character of our perceptions exclusively, but also of things perceived" (Vol. 2, p. 207).
Monday, September 5, 2016
Friday, September 2, 2016
Coffey Critiques Kant #2
More from Peter Coffey's Epistemology; Or the Theory of Knowledge follows.
In Volume 2, Chapter XXI Coffey critiques Kant's a priori view of space as follows.
Kant: "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. ... [T]he representation of space cannot be borrowed through experience from relations of external phenomena, but, on the contrary, this external experience becomes possible only by means of the representation of space" (CPR).
Coffey: The drift of the argument is plain enough. It is that in order, for example, to apprehend that A is in front of me and to the right of B, a spatial relation, I must have first apprehended empty space. Therefore, apprehension of space is an a priori perception.
I skip Coffey's first counter-argument that pertains to geometry.
"Secondly, we have no actual sense or sense intuition of empty space antecedently to our empirical sense perception of individual spatial things and relations, or indeed subsequently either" (191).
Thirdly, as Kant argues, if to apprehend things as extended and spatially related, we must not only have the capacity to do so, but also an a priori actual perception of empty space. Then why doesn't he argue similarly for individual colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.? Instead, he disclaims the need of a priori forms for them.
"Fourthly, the space of which Kant was thinking as perceived a priori is de facto space conceived in the abstract by the understanding" (192).
The second and fourth arguments seem strong, but the third argument less so. Color regarded abstractly, but no particular color, akin to an empty placeholder, makes sense. Ditto for sound, taste, and smell. Kant could have said that colorless, soundless, tasteless, and odorless are properties of some real, non-abstract things, hence a posteriori. However, he denied a posteriori empty space. He wrote, "experience can never supply a proof of empty space" (CPR 200, Penguin Classics)." Huh? What about an empty space on a bookcase shelf?
In Volume 2, Chapter XXI Coffey critiques Kant's a priori view of space as follows.
Kant: "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from external experience. ... [T]he representation of space cannot be borrowed through experience from relations of external phenomena, but, on the contrary, this external experience becomes possible only by means of the representation of space" (CPR).
Coffey: The drift of the argument is plain enough. It is that in order, for example, to apprehend that A is in front of me and to the right of B, a spatial relation, I must have first apprehended empty space. Therefore, apprehension of space is an a priori perception.
I skip Coffey's first counter-argument that pertains to geometry.
"Secondly, we have no actual sense or sense intuition of empty space antecedently to our empirical sense perception of individual spatial things and relations, or indeed subsequently either" (191).
Thirdly, as Kant argues, if to apprehend things as extended and spatially related, we must not only have the capacity to do so, but also an a priori actual perception of empty space. Then why doesn't he argue similarly for individual colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc.? Instead, he disclaims the need of a priori forms for them.
"Fourthly, the space of which Kant was thinking as perceived a priori is de facto space conceived in the abstract by the understanding" (192).
The second and fourth arguments seem strong, but the third argument less so. Color regarded abstractly, but no particular color, akin to an empty placeholder, makes sense. Ditto for sound, taste, and smell. Kant could have said that colorless, soundless, tasteless, and odorless are properties of some real, non-abstract things, hence a posteriori. However, he denied a posteriori empty space. He wrote, "experience can never supply a proof of empty space" (CPR 200, Penguin Classics)." Huh? What about an empty space on a bookcase shelf?
Wednesday, August 31, 2016
Coffey Critiques Kant #1
I have been reading Peter Coffey's 2-volume Epistemology; Or the Theory of Knowledge (#1, #2), first published in 1917. Coffey was an Irish Roman Catholic priest and Neoscholastic philosopher. He often critiques Immanuel Kant's ideas in these volumes. I tip my hat to George H. Smith for recommending this work (link).
In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously posited space and time as "pure intuitions" and "forms of sensibility that are a priori necessary conditions for any possible experience" that the mind imposes upon experience. In Volume 2, Chapter XXI Coffey calls Kant's doctrine confused and ambiguous.
When Kant tried removing from 'the representation of a body' all that belongs to conception and all that belongs to to sensation, he says "there remains something of that empirical intuition, viz. extension and form" that belong to the perceived body. Coffey writes: "Yet in the very next sentence he says that it belongs to 'pure intuition, which a priori . . . exists in the mind as a mere form of sensibility'. But he does not say whether it belongs to this 'pure intuition' as its form, i.e. as a general mode or power of perceiving, or rather as identical with the the actual pure a priori intuition itself ; because he confounds the 'form' of pure intuition with the actual intuition of empty space."
"Now if Kant meant by 'forms of intuition,' consistently and exclusively, mental capacities or powers of apprehending what we become aware of as being endowed with this, that, or the other quality, then of course it is true that the mind has such 'forms,' and has them a priori: in other words, it is true that the mind, in order to become aware of anything as e.g. hard, or cold, or white, or bitter, or loud, or sweet-smelling, or extended, or moving, etc., must have, as a prerequisite condition for such actual perceptions, the corresponding mental capacities or powers of perception. But in that case we should say that there are not merely two a priori forms of sense perception, but as many as there are distinct perceptible sense qualities in physical nature; and the two forms whereby we apprehend the qualities, space and time, we should not call space and time, but forms of our perception of space and time. Kant, however, contends that all the other sense qualities, except space and time, belong to the mental material of perception, viz. to sensations while sense and time alone are mental forms of perception" (p. 188-9).
In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously posited space and time as "pure intuitions" and "forms of sensibility that are a priori necessary conditions for any possible experience" that the mind imposes upon experience. In Volume 2, Chapter XXI Coffey calls Kant's doctrine confused and ambiguous.
When Kant tried removing from 'the representation of a body' all that belongs to conception and all that belongs to to sensation, he says "there remains something of that empirical intuition, viz. extension and form" that belong to the perceived body. Coffey writes: "Yet in the very next sentence he says that it belongs to 'pure intuition, which a priori . . . exists in the mind as a mere form of sensibility'. But he does not say whether it belongs to this 'pure intuition' as its form, i.e. as a general mode or power of perceiving, or rather as identical with the the actual pure a priori intuition itself ; because he confounds the 'form' of pure intuition with the actual intuition of empty space."
"Now if Kant meant by 'forms of intuition,' consistently and exclusively, mental capacities or powers of apprehending what we become aware of as being endowed with this, that, or the other quality, then of course it is true that the mind has such 'forms,' and has them a priori: in other words, it is true that the mind, in order to become aware of anything as e.g. hard, or cold, or white, or bitter, or loud, or sweet-smelling, or extended, or moving, etc., must have, as a prerequisite condition for such actual perceptions, the corresponding mental capacities or powers of perception. But in that case we should say that there are not merely two a priori forms of sense perception, but as many as there are distinct perceptible sense qualities in physical nature; and the two forms whereby we apprehend the qualities, space and time, we should not call space and time, but forms of our perception of space and time. Kant, however, contends that all the other sense qualities, except space and time, belong to the mental material of perception, viz. to sensations while sense and time alone are mental forms of perception" (p. 188-9).
Saturday, August 27, 2016
Rationality & the Reflective Mind #6
More
from Keith Stanovich's Rationality
& the Reflective Mind
follows.
Stanovich links different
kinds of mental pathology with Type 1 (the autonomous mind) and Type 2 processing.
“Cognitive neuroscientists have uncovered cases of mental pathology
that are characterized by inadequate behavioral regulation from the
emotion subsystems in the autonomous mind-- for example [ ] patients
with damage in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. These individuals
have severe difficulties in real-life decision-making but do not
display the impairments in sustained attention and executive control
that are characteristic of individuals with damage in dorsolateral
frontal regions.”
Wednesday, August 24, 2016
Rationality & the Reflective Mind #5
More from Keith Stanovich's Rationality & the Reflective Mind follows.
Some people have argued that the research in the heuristics and biases tradition -- began by Kahneman and Tversky in the late 1970s -- has not shown human irrationality at all. They argue that the assumption of maximal human rationality is the proper default position, and have been dubbed the Panglossians. (Panglossian means naively optimistic and is based on the character Pangloss in Voltaire's Candide.) This position posits no difference between descriptive and normative models of performance "because human performance is normative." How do they explain the many observed errors of human thought? They argue that the normative model applied is not appropriate because the subject's interpretation of the task is different from what the researcher's is. They also argue that the modal response in the task makes sense from an evolutionary perspective (p. 8-9).
The Panglossians that Stanovich names are philosophers Nicholas Rescher and L. J. Cohen. Rescher argued that "to construe the data of these interesting experimental studies [of probabilistic reasoning] to mean that people are systematically programmed to fallacious processes of reasoning....is questionable. .... While all (normal) people are to be credited with the capacity to reason, they frequently do not exercise it well." Cohen attributes errors to "adventitious causes" and finds little interest in them. In his view human performance arises from an intrinsic human competence that is impeccably rational, but deviations may occur due to inattention, memory lapses, etc.
Johnson-Laird and Byrne articulate a view of rational thought that parses Cohen's distinction between competence and performance. Stanovich says their view highlights the importance of the reflective mind. They hold that people are programmed to accept inferences as valid provided they have no mental model of the premises that contradict the inference. However, the search for contradictory models is "not governed by any systematic or comprehensive principles" (p. 165-6).
Some people have argued that the research in the heuristics and biases tradition -- began by Kahneman and Tversky in the late 1970s -- has not shown human irrationality at all. They argue that the assumption of maximal human rationality is the proper default position, and have been dubbed the Panglossians. (Panglossian means naively optimistic and is based on the character Pangloss in Voltaire's Candide.) This position posits no difference between descriptive and normative models of performance "because human performance is normative." How do they explain the many observed errors of human thought? They argue that the normative model applied is not appropriate because the subject's interpretation of the task is different from what the researcher's is. They also argue that the modal response in the task makes sense from an evolutionary perspective (p. 8-9).
The Panglossians that Stanovich names are philosophers Nicholas Rescher and L. J. Cohen. Rescher argued that "to construe the data of these interesting experimental studies [of probabilistic reasoning] to mean that people are systematically programmed to fallacious processes of reasoning....is questionable. .... While all (normal) people are to be credited with the capacity to reason, they frequently do not exercise it well." Cohen attributes errors to "adventitious causes" and finds little interest in them. In his view human performance arises from an intrinsic human competence that is impeccably rational, but deviations may occur due to inattention, memory lapses, etc.
Johnson-Laird and Byrne articulate a view of rational thought that parses Cohen's distinction between competence and performance. Stanovich says their view highlights the importance of the reflective mind. They hold that people are programmed to accept inferences as valid provided they have no mental model of the premises that contradict the inference. However, the search for contradictory models is "not governed by any systematic or comprehensive principles" (p. 165-6).
Sunday, August 21, 2016
Rationality & the Reflective Mind #4
Each of us has most likely experienced our minds drifting away from what we most want to think about or do at a given time. It even happens while reading. This phenomena is briefly addressed in Rationality & the Reflective Mind.
Stanovich cites a journal article, not by him, about mind wandering. It describes mind wandering as sharing "certain similarities with standard views of controlled processing, however, there is an important difference. Controlled processing is generally associated with the intentional pursuit of a goal. Mind wandering, however, often occurs without intention....mind wandering involves executive control yet seems to lack deliberate intent."
Stanovich responds: "I would argue that what [the authors] are struggling to portray here are two different kinds of Type 2 processing. One is an attempt to exhaustively model an imaginary world that would facilitate the primary task. The other is a less computationally expensive type of cognition that proceeds successively through the most convenient and salient associate of a single (often incomplete) focal model."
It seems to me that "an imaginary world" here means to consider a hypothesis, an alternative scenario, a counterfactual, or something similar, connected with pursuit of the intended goal. The second sentence in more commonplace words seems to say "our mind drifts to something not as demanding or more fun."
Stanovich cites a journal article, not by him, about mind wandering. It describes mind wandering as sharing "certain similarities with standard views of controlled processing, however, there is an important difference. Controlled processing is generally associated with the intentional pursuit of a goal. Mind wandering, however, often occurs without intention....mind wandering involves executive control yet seems to lack deliberate intent."
Stanovich responds: "I would argue that what [the authors] are struggling to portray here are two different kinds of Type 2 processing. One is an attempt to exhaustively model an imaginary world that would facilitate the primary task. The other is a less computationally expensive type of cognition that proceeds successively through the most convenient and salient associate of a single (often incomplete) focal model."
It seems to me that "an imaginary world" here means to consider a hypothesis, an alternative scenario, a counterfactual, or something similar, connected with pursuit of the intended goal. The second sentence in more commonplace words seems to say "our mind drifts to something not as demanding or more fun."
Friday, August 19, 2016
Rationality & the Reflective Mind #3
More from Keith Stanovich's Rationality & the Reflective Mind follows.
"One interesting implication that follows from the distinction between the algorithmic mind and the reflective mind is that measures of so-called "executive functioning" in the neuropsychological literature actually measure nothing of the sort. The term executive implies that these tasks assess the most strategic (often deemed the "highest") level of cognitive functioning--the reflective level. However, a consideration of the tasks most commonly used in the neuropsychological literature to assess executive functioning . . . reveals that almost without exception they are optimal performance tasks and that most of them rather severely constrain reflective level functioning" (p. 56).
Other than a couple of examples he gives, I am unfamiliar with the neuropsychological literature he refers to. So I trust that he says.
As said in my previous post, Stanovich says that IQ tests rely mainly on the algorithmic mind whereas critical thinking tests rely mainly on the reflective mind. Reflecting on my own life, my taking tests in college and actuarial exams seemed to rely mainly on my algorithmic mind, whereas my later work often called for my reflective mind. Of course, it took a lot of study and often reflection to make the the test/exam material algorithmic. The work often included goals, and/or how to achieve them, that were not well-defined, more so with time. It called for ranking the importance of multiple goals and choosing the best, or at least sufficient, way to achieve them. Doing the work therefore called upon the reflective mind. Similarly, executive level functioning in business -- but not merely there -- often calls upon the reflective mind. Moreover, the higher the executive level, the more that is the case, generally speaking. It isn't always the case, since biases can creeps in, e.g. favoritism in promotions. More responsibility and personal autonomy generally increases with promotions.
"One interesting implication that follows from the distinction between the algorithmic mind and the reflective mind is that measures of so-called "executive functioning" in the neuropsychological literature actually measure nothing of the sort. The term executive implies that these tasks assess the most strategic (often deemed the "highest") level of cognitive functioning--the reflective level. However, a consideration of the tasks most commonly used in the neuropsychological literature to assess executive functioning . . . reveals that almost without exception they are optimal performance tasks and that most of them rather severely constrain reflective level functioning" (p. 56).
Other than a couple of examples he gives, I am unfamiliar with the neuropsychological literature he refers to. So I trust that he says.
As said in my previous post, Stanovich says that IQ tests rely mainly on the algorithmic mind whereas critical thinking tests rely mainly on the reflective mind. Reflecting on my own life, my taking tests in college and actuarial exams seemed to rely mainly on my algorithmic mind, whereas my later work often called for my reflective mind. Of course, it took a lot of study and often reflection to make the the test/exam material algorithmic. The work often included goals, and/or how to achieve them, that were not well-defined, more so with time. It called for ranking the importance of multiple goals and choosing the best, or at least sufficient, way to achieve them. Doing the work therefore called upon the reflective mind. Similarly, executive level functioning in business -- but not merely there -- often calls upon the reflective mind. Moreover, the higher the executive level, the more that is the case, generally speaking. It isn't always the case, since biases can creeps in, e.g. favoritism in promotions. More responsibility and personal autonomy generally increases with promotions.
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