How We Know #4: Concept-Formation

I think Binswanger misrepresents John Locke and misclassifies him as a Moderate Realist. "Locke's version of Moderate Realism tries to avoid positing non-specific universals, but implies them nonetheless. ... Here, "whiteness" is the universal. It has some non-specific attribute, such as is found in the slightly different shades of white characterizing chalk, snow, and milk. ... On any Moderate Realist Theory, we grasp the non-specific attribute by abstraction, which is conceived as a subtractive process, as a process of disregarding differences. Locke, for instance, writes that "the mind, to make general ideas comprehending several particulars, leaves out ... those qualities that distinguish them " [Locke, III, VI, 32 (my emphasis)]" (p. 103-4).

I disagree with Binswanger's interpretation. Locke neither implied nor posited imperceptible and precisely identical fragments (essences) that exist within every particular regarded as a unit of the same concept. Locke is usually classified as a Conceptualist. Regarding him as a Moderate Realist is bizarre, considering his remarks about real essence in Essay Concerning Human Understanding (ECHU). He contrasted real essences (metaphysical) to nominal essences (epistemological). For Locke the real essence of physical objects is the imperceptible micro-structure that causes the observable qualities of the object. Nominal essences are formed by abstraction, are "the workmanship of the understanding", and are based on similarity (e.g. ECHU, Bk III, Chap III, 14-15). Also, see sections 1 and 2 here.

See ECHU, II, XI, 9 and ECHU, III, IV, 15 where Locke writes about whiteness. Contrary to Binswanger's claim, Locke did not posit a metaphysical universal of whiteness that is identical in each instance. Indeed, the second paragraph denies the existence of a known real essence of whiteness. "There is neither ... nor a supposed, but an unknown, real essence, with properties ... But, on the contrary, in simple ideas the whole signification of the name is known at once, and consists not of parts, whereof more or less being put in, the idea may be varied, and so the signification of name be obscure, or uncertain."

"Abstract ideas are the workmanship of the understanding, but have their foundation in the similitude of things. I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that Nature, in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the race of animals, and all things propagated by seed. But yet I think we may say, the sorting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion, from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms, (for, in that sense, the word form has a very proper signification,) to which as particular things existing are found to agree, so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that classis. For when we say this is a man, that a horse; this justice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else but rank things under different specific names, as agreeing to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the signs? And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind; which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under?" (ECHU, III, III, 13).

Locke scholar Michael Ayers (1991) wrote:

"Locke really believed that nothing on earth could possibly perform the function that the Aristotelians ascribed to their specific essences or forms. Although the Aristotelian essence and Locke's nominal essence both define the boundaries of a species, the former does so ontologically.  ...  But the Lockean nominal essence is intrinsically an epistemological essence and nothing more, a criterion by reference to which we mark off the members of the species. The boundary marked is a precise one which owes its existence to our drawing it: reality itself simply could not, in Locke's view, supply such a boundary. Reality can supply resemblances, but resemblances do not constitute natural boundaries. Resemblances do not draw lines" (Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, Vol. 2, 67-68, my bold).

About Binswanger's quote from Locke (first paragraph above), how is Locke saying "leave out" (neglect or ignore) specific qualities of particulars so different from Ayn Rand's "omitting measurements"? How is Ayn Rand's "omitting measurements" not “disregarding differences” (Locke's phrase), at least different measurements or numbers? How is "omitting measurements" not subtractive? Omit means "leave out," despite Binswanger (and Rand) insisting that it doesn't. "[O]mitting measurements is not a process of deletion or excision" (p. 115).

Locke recognized how little men knew about real essence or the substratum of substances in his time. Binswanger is off-base when he says: "The Realists' separation of existence and identity reaches its clearest expression in Locke. His concept of "substratum" in which a thing's qualities supposedly inhere is a "something I know not what" -- i.e. an existent without any identity (since the identity pertains to the qualities not in the substratum)" (p. 105).

I disagree with his interpretation. Corpuscularianism was a physical theory that supposes all matter to be composed of minute particles, similar to atomism. The theory became important in the seventeenth century. Among the leading corpuscularians were John Locke and his scientist-friend Robert Boyle. Locke lived before scientists discovered sound empirical evidence of atoms, molecules, elements, and chemistry. Ergo, he did not know then-unknown details about the "substratum" underlying objects that we can perceive. Locke can be read as saying nothing stronger than that, via perception, we can receive no clear, distinct, positive idea of substratum; that the only concept of substratum of which our experience affords us is an obscure one. If Ayn Rand had said she knew nothing about subatomic particles and the nature of chemical bonding and how those things relate to everyday perception, would Binswanger have turned Ayn Rand into a Moderate Realist? I highly doubt it.

My essay Pursuing Similarity is here. 

How We Know #3: Concept-Formation

Chapter 3 is devoted to the nature of concepts. Binswanger says there are four main theories -- Realism (e.g. Plato), Moderate Realism (e.g. Aristotle), Nominalism (e.g. Wittgenstein), and Objectivist (Ayn Rand).

"According to Realism, a concept is a term that designates a metaphysical universal: a special kind of non-specific element present in all the members of a class, an element that is grasped directly by some sort of non-sensory "intuition" or "insight"" (p.101).

"Moderate Realists count as realists because they hold that abstraction refers to metaphysical universals; the theory is "moderate" in holding that these universals exist as aspects of perceptual concretes, not as separate entities dwelling in another world. In effect, Moderate Realism shatters the Platonic Form and puts a fragment of it inside each concrete" (p.102).

Binswanger elaborates his version of Objectivist epistemology. 

Binswanger says more about measurement omission than Ayn Rand did. He quotes Rand: "If a child considers a match, a pencil, and a stick, he observes that length is the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ. The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept "length," the child's mind retains the attribute and omits the measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were identified in words, it would consist of the following: Length must exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall identify 'length' as that attribute of any existent possessing it which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without specifying the quantity." [ITOE, 11]

Rand seems to say that "omitting measurements" is only omitting specific numbers -- of inches or centimeters or whatnot -- not omitting the attribute length. The match, pencil, and stick each have a length in reality, even if the child knows nothing about authentic measurement. In other words, there is length (metaphysical, ontological) and measured length (epistemological). The former can be simply perceived; the latter requires a special effort. The former doesn't require numbers; the latter does. The former is not a comparison; the latter is a comparison of two lengths, one from a measuring instrument (ruler or tape measure or whatnot).

Binswanger does not say what I just did, but he portrays the child's understanding of length somewhat differently than Rand did. He writes: "In speaking of "measurements" I am referring to the subconscious mechanics of the concept-forming process, not to any consciously performed, explicit, process of measuring. A child beginning to conceptualize things is, of course, incapable of explicit measurement. On the conscious level, he is only aware of similarities and differences. But the objective basis of those similarities and differences is the quantitative variation of a commensurable characteristic" (p.118). He does not claim the child implicitly measures.

Binswanger tries to explain that humans don't really omit measurements. More exactly they recognize that measurements vary. He says that things that are similar differ quantitatively. "Similarity is measurement proximity. "Proximity" is a relative term, depending on a contrast with something that is more distant, which can be called "the foil." Similarity is thus contextual, a matter of relative proximity of measurements in contrast to the relatively distant measurement of a foil. In such a set-up, the bigger difference swamps the smaller difference, making the smaller difference appear as similarity. What is experienced as similarity is, at root, lesser difference" (p. 112).

Here at least the smaller differences among similar things are swamped rather than omitted. 

There are also sections of Chapter 3 on integration and unit-economy.

How We Know #2: Perception

Chapter 2 is about perception. I rank it as the best chapter in the book. His treatment is more elaborate than Ayn Rand's, but very coherent with it and there is little disagreement. They differ slightly on how sensations or sensory input are integrated into perceptions.

Some key points follow.
- Perception is axiomatic. It is our primary, basic contact with the world.
- Perception is inerrant and the foundation of all knowledge. Any errors are conceptual.
- We are aware of existence as a unified whole, not involving our consciously constructing things to be aware of existence. 
- Perceptual content is automated, a biological given, not subject to volitional control. We have some control over attention but not content. 
- He appeals to the direct realism of J. J. Gibson.

A rather unique feature is his distinction form vs. object. He traces it back to Thomas Aquinas. Leonard Peikoff made the same distinction in OPAR, but not as strongly as Binswanger does. 

My aside: this use of form is very different from Aristotle's. Aristotle famously held that every physical object is a compound of matter and form. Binswanger uses form to mean the nature of perceptual awareness.

He tackles many of the topics often discussed by philosophers regarding perception: hallucination, naïve realism, representationalism, and appearance versus reality. 

How We Know #1: Foundations

How We Know is the title of a recent book by Harry Binswanger. He presents his theory of knowledge based on Ayn Rand's Objectivist philosophy. He was a friend and associate of her for many years.

The book is well-written in my opinion and well worth reading. I agree with most of it. I will devote several blogposts to it.

Chapter 1 is titled Foundations. His foundations are the same as Ayn Rand's. I refer the reader to the Table of Contents using the Look Inside feature at the above Amazon link for what the fundamentals are.

He emphasizes consciousness being a biological faculty more so than Rand did.

"Conscious activities, whether sensory or conceptual, have, like the heartbeat, a biological function. Man has eyes for the same reason he has a heart: to sustain his life; vision is an adaptive, biological, life-sustaining capacity. The same is true of the other sense modalities: each provides man with life-sustaining information about the world.
     And the same is true of the faculty of reason. The mind, the reasoning intellect is a vital organ. A biologist could not understand the heart if he did not know its biological function, and a philosopher cannot understand reason, or any other faculty of consciousness, if he ignores the biological function of that faculty" (p. 37).

He addresses what consciousness does for animals to prepare the stage for what it does for man.

Rand was rather skeptical about evolution. Binswanger is not. He defers some of his discussion of evolutionary biology until later in the book, but biology is prominent in Chapter 1.

He gives a different meaning to "self-evident" than most people. Self-evident means "available to direct awareness. "Self-evident" is not a synonym for "obvious." To one who has learned arithmetic, it is obvious that two plus two is four, but that truth is not self-evident; it is inferred by a process of comparison and counting. But that the page you are reading exists is not an inference; it is self-evident. The data of sensory perception are self-evident (23).

Ayn Rand said the last thing, too, but it seems unusual in philosophy. Neither The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Colliers-Macmillan 1967) nor the on-line Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy have "self-evident" as a separate entry.

Bird Eggs and Wings

A NY Times article caught my attention. Why Do Bird Eggs Have Different Shapes? Look to the Wings. The article relates egg shape to "flight ability," but doesn't explain what that means. Speed? Stamina? Maneuverability? Efficiency?

Having recently returned from New Zealand, it made me wonder about kiwis. Kiwis can't fly and have tiny stubby wings. The article suggested to me a kiwi egg would be more spherical, less elongated, and not pointy. It isn't pointy as I expected, but it is elongated similar to an egg of a wondering albatross, which has great flying ability and huge wings, at least in length, relative to their body size.

By the way, while in New Zealand I was surprised when I saw an x-ray image that showed egg size relative to the mother's body size. Why Is the Kiwi’s Egg So Big?

We also saw an albatross breeding ground on the Otago Peninsula near Dunedin. About the only time they spend on land is for breeding. The rest is in air or on water. They migrate eastward encircling Antarctica in the process. They fly long distances expending very little energy by soaring (using the wind with minimal wing movement).

New Zealand

A vacation in New Zealand is mainly why I have not posted here in 2+ weeks. My wife and I did a 14-day escorted tour of the north and south islands. NZ has lots of beautiful scenery, about 4.5 million human inhabitants, 6 million cows, and 56 million sheep. There are 19 breeds of sheep.

We heard about common brushtail possums. Like the link says, NZ has about 30 million of them (about 70 million several years ago), they aren't native but were introduced there, where they have no natural predators (e.g. coyotes). They differ from the Virginia or North American possums in the USA. Many people in NZ regard them as destructive pests. Some blend their fur with merino wool to make very warm and expensive clothing of incomparable quality and durability.

We heard a lot about rugby, the favorite sport in NZ, and the Maori people. We rode a JetBoat. We saw a few places where scenes from the Lord of the Rings trilogy and Hobbit movies were filmed, including Hobbiton. We saw glowworms.

A visit to Rutherford's Den was not part of the tour, but we chanced upon this delightful place walking during free time in Christchurch. Ernest Rutherford was born and grew up in New Zealand.

Fisher's Theory of Interest #4

Fisher says the rate of interest is based in part on the preference for present versus future goods, or human impatience. The chief other part is an objective element, investment opportunity. Fisher's human impatience is essentially like what other economists have called "time preference" or some similar term. Böhm-Bawerk called it the "perspective undervaluation of the future." It's the marginal want for present goods versus future goods. Indeed, Chapter IV of Fisher's book is titled "Time Preference (Human Impatience)." He treats these terms as synonyms.

Fisher's explanation of time preference differs from others in that he makes income -- rather than, say, goods or wealth -- central. "The degree of impatience varies, of course, with the individual, but when we have selected our individual, the degree of his impatience depends on his entire income stream, beginning at the present instant and stretching indefinitely into the future" (Theory of Interest, p. 66).

I can't remember him specifically addressing the impatience or time preference of many people who "live payday to payday" with all their income coming from labor. Surely they have a very high time preference for immediate income to satisfy their desire to spend, often limited to rent, food, and other essentials. When I posted Interest As Cost Immediacy in April, 2016 I was not aware of Fisher's term impatience, but it it would have been an apt alternative.